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 Significant levels of expert disagreement are found over UK energy system futures 
 Buildings’ heating and personal transport futures are particularly contested topics 
 Policy Delphi is useful to reveal the extent and range of expert disagreement 
 Expert views reflect parametric and structural uncertainties and value differences 
 More evidence, and evidence reviews are unlikely to fully resolve expert differences 
 
Abstract 
Recent literature has highlighted the need to critically examine the assumptions and values 
that influence scenario analysis and expert advice on contested topics. To this end, this paper 
presents the results of a large scale two-round Policy Delphi expert survey on UK energy 
futures. The survey constitutes one of the most detailed and wide-ranging analyses of UK-
based energy researchers and stakeholders (policy makers, businesses and civil society 
groups). Through a quantitative and qualitative analysis of expert views on two particularly 
challenging and contested topics (the future of heating provision in buildings and the future of 
personal transport), we develop an understanding of the extent of expert disagreement and 
the reasons behind it. For both heating and transport cases, disagreements and uncertainties 
emerged in terms of a number of specific parameters (particularly related to technical 
performance and the feasible pace of technology diffusion) and structural uncertainties 
(related to system boundaries, sociotechnical dynamics and the endogenous role of policy), 
and also epistemic and normative differences among participants. By setting out the diversity 
of expert views and reasoning on contested issues, Policy Delphi can help decision-makers 
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understand expert disagreement, and how it is associated with different epistemic and 
normative perspectives. 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
While climate experts agree to a very high extent in their assessments of the likely causes and 
geophysical impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2018), the necessary response – in terms of 
the future of energy systems around the world – is much more contested. This is 
understandable: energy systems are complex and multi-scale networks of technological 
infrastructure, public and private organisations, institutional rules and social and community 
practices (Hughes, 1983; Geels, 2002). As a result, a diverse and dynamic pattern of drivers 
and responses play out across different aspects of the system, in production, distribution and 
consumption, and different energy services such as heating and transport. This renders 
energy futures indeterminate and open to divergent expectations.  
 
Many analysts anticipate highly disruptive futures for energy systems, in the context of 
ambitious national and international policy targets for decarbonisation (such as the 2016 Paris 
Agreement on climate change), emerging technological changes, and wide-ranging societal, 
behavioural and demographic trends (e.g. Energy Institute, 2017; PwC, 2016; Wilson, 2018). 
At the same time, energy systems have historically exhibited continuity-based change, in 
terms of the renewal and adaption of existing infrastructure and organisations (Van der 
Vleuten and Högselius, 2012; Winskel and Radcliffe, 2014; Winskel, 2018). Alongside 
disruptive visions, a ‘repurposing’ narrative is also evident in recent thinking about energy 
futures (e.g. Howard and Bengherbi, 2016).  
 
This article presents results from a detailed Policy Delphi survey which explored the nature of 
the UK’s future energy system transition over the next two decades as it responds to the 
challenge of deep decarbonisation. Although the survey covered many different aspects of the 
UK energy system transition, we focus here on two contested aspects: buildings’ heating and 
personal transport. We pay particular attention to mapping disagreement on some key aspects 
of the transition, the expression of disagreement in terms of parametric and structural 
uncertainty, and the role of underlying values and assumptions in shaping disagreement.  
 
A key feature that distinguishes Policy Delphi from conventional Delphi survey designs is its 
focus on understanding disagreement within an expert community. According to de Loë et al., 
Policy Delphi designs are intended to “identify opposing positions and opinions on policy 
questions” (de Loë et al., 2016, p. 79), setting out the range of perspectives on a complex 
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issue. Similarly, Coates has argued that Delphi methods are valuable for presenting 
participants with the complexity of issues and diversity of expert views, and thereby providing 
an opportunity to challenge their assumptions (Coates, 1975). For these authors, 
understanding the reasons why experts disagree is at least as important as identifying areas 
of consensus. Despite this, expert disagreement remains under-reported and under-theorised 
in many Policy Delphi studies.  
 
Since long-term decisions on energy policy need to be taken despite such uncertainty, a Policy 
Delphi survey was designed to explore expert and stakeholders’ views on how disruptive and 
continuity-based ‘logics’ are likely to play out in contrasting scenarios for the UK energy 
system over the next two decades, up to 2040. Both scenarios involve major changes – a 
‘system transition’ (Geels, 2002) – in response to policy and other drivers, but the social and 
technical system dynamics involved are very different under the two transition logics. 
 
Under a disruption-based transition, new technologies, business models and behaviours 
provoke a fundamental remaking of the UK energy system. Existing organisations and 
infrastructures are unable to respond sufficiently to disruptive forces affecting the sector, and 
are destabilised and then displaced. Digitisation and smaller scale generation and storage 
drive a rescaling and decentralisation of the system, both technically and institutionally, with 
regional and city/local authorities becoming key energy strategists. In this scenario, 
consumers might also become more influential in the energy system transition, for instance 
as prosumers or through active demand-side management becoming mainstream. 
 
Alternatively, under a continuity-based transition logic, system transition is pursued mainly by 
adapting and repurposing existing organisations and infrastructures. New technologies, 
business models and behaviours are adopted, but as extensions and adaptions of existing 
ones. For the relatively highly centralised UK energy system, this would mean that economies 
of scale in technological and organisational form remain important. Smart technologies are 
introduced, but without fundamentally disrupting or rescaling system operation and ownership. 
Similarly, the system remains subject to a high degree of national strategic direction, and 
citizen engagement remains limited. 
 
In this paper we use these transition logics as heuristic tools for revealing differences in expert 
reasoning, including parametric and structural uncertainties and value differences. The paper 
proceeds as follows: the next section reviews how expert disagreement is understood within 
the Policy Delphi literature, and outlines the range of reasons why experts and stakeholders 
disagree on complex sociotechnical systems; Section 3 sets out the methodological approach 
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used for conducting and analysing our two-round Policy Delphi study; the survey findings on 
buildings’ heating and personal transport are reported and discussed in Section 4 and 
conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
 
2: Understanding expert disagreement in complex sociotechnical systems 
2.1. Expert disagreement in Policy Delphi studies 
   
Understanding why experts disagree is a defining feature of Policy Delphi studies. There is, 
however, no agreed method for analysing and/or presenting the reasons for expert 
disagreement in the research literature. Writing in 1975, Coates observed that researchers do 
not tend to report the diversity of experts’ judgments and their underlying assumptions, adding 
that “more attention should go into the basis of divergence rather than the basis of 
convergence” (Coates, 1975, p. 194). Since then a variety of approaches have emerged. 
 
One common approach is to group similar answers together (either through cluster methods, 
factor analysis or similar tools), and thereby build a theoretical model that accounts for a wide 
range of factors in a system (e.g. Steinert, 2009), or construct alternative visions of the future 
(for example, Tapio, 2003). This approach is useful for summarising a range of expert 
perspectives, and embodies a recognition that the pursuit of simple solutions and expert 
consensus in the context of complex problems is misguided (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; 
Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Stirling, 2010). However, a weakness is that typically little 
attention is paid to the diversity of participants’ underlying reasoning. Tapio, for example, notes 
that as a result of using cluster analysis, some participants who reached similar conclusions 
but for different reasons were placed in the same category in his analysis, undermining the 
coherence of the clusters generated (Tapio, 2003, p. 98).  
 
Others place a greater emphasis on understanding the full range of participants’ reasoning 
when reporting their Delphi studies, highlighting where and why participants disagree (e.g. 
Banwell et al., 2005; Pätäri, 2010; Landeta and Barrutia, 2011; van de Linde and van der Duin, 
2011). For Landeta and Barrutia (2011), this was an important output for decision-makers, as 
their study was designed to reveal the differences in opinions and perspectives from across 
the Basque university community, so as to inform the development of new university structures 
and processes. Similarly, in a study designed to elicit expert views on the processes of 
radicalisation and extremism in the Netherlands, Van de Linde and Van der Duin highlighted 
factors that only a minority of experts considered important, and argued that they require more 
attention (2011, p. 1562). Pätäri (2010) presented a detailed analysis of the key drivers 
shaping the bioenergy sector, associated business models, and the role of different companies 
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(Pätäri, 2010). The author used quotations to reveal points of expert disagreement and 
perceived contingencies, providing a broad overview of the varied issues and perspectives 
that emerged in the survey.  
 
Such studies resonate with Stirling’s observation that while researchers sometimes assume 
policymakers desire simple answers, it is often more helpful to be presented with an overview 
of the range of positions and perspectives on a given issue, reflecting the complexity and the 
full range of possibilities and implications (Stirling, 2010). Yet, while there is increasing 
recognition of the value of mapping how and why Policy Delphi participants disagree, more 
attention should be paid to the divergent reasonings underpinning disagreement. For example, 
if experts disagree because they refer to different sources of evidence then this implies a need 
for efforts to synthesise the evidence base. Secondly, if disagreements reflect uncertainties in 
the available evidence then new studies may be needed. Finally, in cases where differences 
in values account for differences in experts’ assessments, then new evidence or evidence 
synthesis are unlikely to resolve matters, and value differences should be made explicit in the 
policy debate (Pielke Jr, 2007; Stirling, 2010). The next section draws on literature from energy 
scenarios and the sociology of expertise to further examine the range of reasons why experts 
disagree.  
 
2.2. Assessing the future in complex sociotechnical systems: parametric and 
structural uncertainties 
 
In the UK and internationally, decision-makers have relied upon energy scenarios for decades 
to understand how complex sociotechnical systems may change under different conditions 
(Hughes and Strachan, 2010). For example, in the early 2000s, scenarios derived from the 
MARKAL energy model were used to support and strengthen the UK Government’s 2050 
targets for carbon emissions reductions by demonstrating that the targets are technically and 
economically achievable (Strachan et al., 2009).  
 
While Derbyshire and Wright (2014) have suggested that rather than developing scenarios, a 
better way for organisations to handle deep uncertainty is to construct ‘antifragile’ strategies 
that mitigate against losses from the worst possible set of outcomes, in practice governments 
and others seeking to steer the energy system transition often remain reliant upon experts’ 
assessments of what types of changes are possible and desirable. As such, despite the 
indeterminacy of the future, scenarios informed by expert views are likely to maintain an 
important role – not as predictors of the future, but, as Eyre and Barauh (2014) have argued 
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– as tools to broadly describe the uncertain space within which actual futures are likely to 
develop. 
 
Yet while decision-makers are attracted to scenario development because of the challenges 
of making decisions under conditions of complexity and uncertainty, these same conditions 
make it likely that experts will disagree. Funtowicz and Ravetz defined the term ‘post-normal 
science’ to characterise such circumstances, in which policy-makers are tasked with making 
time-sensitive and high-stakes decisions on a complex topic in a context of uncertainty over 
the facts and disputes over values (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). A better understanding of 
the different reasons why experts disagree under conditions of post-normal science may offer 
improved ways to understand Policy Delphi results, and their implications.  
 
A relatively simple reason for disagreement in expert views of how a complex system is likely 
to change relates to their assessments of specific parameters. A group of experts may agree 
on a shortlist of key quantifiable parameters as shaping the future development of a system, 
yet disagree on the value of those parameters – for example, how a population size and form 
will change, or how the cost and performance of specific technologies will change. This 
‘parametric uncertainty’ (Hughes et al., 2013, p. 47) can result in experts reaching different 
conclusions on the future development of a system.  
 
In addition, there is also the uncertainty that arises due to the multiple ways in which the 
different parts of a complex system are defined and interact with each other – known as 
‘structural uncertainty’ (Trutnevyte et al., 2016). Structural uncertainties arise from 
indeterminacies over how different parameters interact, but also from which parameters matter 
most, how problems are framed, how system boundaries are defined, and the different 
pressures driving change. For example, technological innovations may be brought to market 
in different forms, under a range of public support measures and private business models, and 
be shaped by a variety of broader societal and demographic trends – resulting in an 
indeterminate array of possible outcomes (Hofman and Elzen, 2010; Hughes et al., 2013). 
Analysts can therefore agree in their assessment of what the important factors are but differ 
in their view of how they are most likely to interact to produce a single (or limited number of) 
future outcome(s).  
 
Expert disagreements over parametric and structural uncertainties reflect differences in 
epistemic and normative views. These differences have a number of origins. Large complex 
systems are often analysed using interdisciplinary analysis, because different disciplinary 
perspectives or ‘paradigms’ bring different features into focus while marginalising or ‘black-
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boxing’ others (Kuhn, 1970; Pinch, 1992; Jasanoff, 2004). By necessity, different disciplinary 
perspectives operationalise distinct descriptive and normative assumptions about how the 
system works and what the role of actors, technologies, and organisations is therein. 
Consequently, researchers working in different disciplines may come to define a problem and 
its system boundaries in different terms. For instance, economists and energy modellers often 
operate under a ‘cost-driven paradigm’ where actors are assumed to act uniformly in 
predictable and rational ways (Li and Pye, 2018), whereas sociologists often reveal diverse 
and surprising ways in which actors engage with specific technologies and shape their 
development in practice (see, for example, a typology of solar panel users, in Ghanem and 
Haggett, 2011). Differences in experts’ assessments of parameters and structural 
considerations may therefore reflect the different disciplinary lenses and associated 
assumptions which influence their observation of the given system.  
 
In addition to the intrinsic assumptions within a field, researchers also rely on a set of heuristics 
that may go unchallenged within their community. For example, during the oil crisis energy 
scenario developers predominantly focused on exploring the implications of variations in fossil 
fuel prices, economic growth, and energy demand, while after nuclear power plant accidents 
they began exploring the potential implications of removing such power plants from the system 
(Trutnevyte et al., 2016). These prioritisations may be compounded further by individuals’ (or 
indeed a community’s) technological optimism (Dorr, 2017) as well as their models of how 
social and technological drivers of change interact.  
 
Researchers may implicitly ascribe to a view of technological determinism, according to which 
technology diffusion determines changes in social practices (Winner, 1980) or lean more 
towards social determinism – the view that social and cultural values and practices are the 
key drivers shaping the emergence and manifestation of a technology in a society. In an 
example of the latter relevant for the present study, Hughes and Strachan report that some 
modellers have associated the diffusion of distributed energy generation technologies with a 
dominance of community values (Hughes and Strachan, 2010), when in practice it is possible 
that distributed generation technologies are adopted independently of any rise in community 
values. Such assumptions have been found to be reinforced in scenario communities through 
the use of specific heuristics (e.g. availability, recency, saliency and familiarity) (Bradfield, 
2008; Hughes and Strachan, 2010; McDowall et al., 2014; Li, 2017; Li and Pye, 2018).  
 
Alongside these shared assumptions and heuristics, underlying values also shape individual 
assessments of uncertain and contested outcomes. From a ‘cultural theory’ perspective, these 
values influence how individuals interpret risks and judge appropriate societal responses 
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(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson 1984; 1990). According to this view, varied 
orientations towards factors such as social coordination, group collaboration, personal choice 
and rule imposition are associated with distinctive ‘worldviews’: fatalists, individualists, 
hierarchists and egalitarians. As many studies have shown, experts involved in policy 
controversies may disagree in similar ways to the wider public in their interpretations of the 
evidence base, acceptable levels of risk and appropriate societal responses (Nelkin, 1975; 
Jasanoff, 1990; Sarewitz, 2004; Hulme, 2009). Moreover, in their expert elicitation exercise, 
Pye and colleagues found that values have a more influential impact on experts’ long term 
estimates than short term estimates  (Pye et al., 2018). 
 
In summary, experts’ expectations of how a complex energy system may develop will vary 
according to differences in their assessments of parameters and structural features, and these 
differences in turn reflect a range of assumptions, heuristics and values.  
 
2.3. Implications for resolving disagreement 
The previous section suggests that expert disagreements on complex issues cannot always 
be resolved with more evidence. However, structured and open dialogues between scenario 
developers and other experts and stakeholders can help to identify implicit assumptions and 
heuristics, and thereby facilitate learning (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Hughes and Strachan 
identified a need for more open engagement in the construction of scenarios, to allow the 
researchers and decision-makers’ assumptions to be challenged, because otherwise “[they] 
can prevent decision-makers from considering the possibility of undesirable outcomes”, 
thereby exposing themselves to unmitigated risks, missed opportunities and “tunnel vision” 
(Hughes and Strachan, 2010, p. 6057). Similarly, Li and Pye identified a need for energy policy 
design to “escape from caged thinking concerning what can or cannot be included in models 
and therefore what types of uncertainties can or cannot be explored” (2018, p. 130).  
 
These arguments resonate with literature in the field of Science and Technology Studies, 
which has highlighted the importance of epistemic diversity and constructive challenge for 
facilitating learning within expert and policy communities (Rip, 2003; Kattirtzi, 2016). 
Researchers here have argued that policy-makers find it valuable to be presented with diverse 
experts and stakeholders’ views on a contested topic, as it provides them with a broader 
understanding of the evidence and of the range of issues at stake (Pielke Jr, 2007; Stirling, 
2010). In addition to these ‘substantive’ reasons for promoting diversity, there is also the 
‘normative’ argument that giving voice to a wider variety of perspectives in a process intended 





3: Research Design 
Formed as part of a wider project carried out by the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC), 
the two-round Policy Delphi study reported here was conducted between late 2017 and early 
2018. Panellists were recruited from three communities:  the UKERC interdisciplinary research 
community; a wider interdisciplinary group of UK-based academic researchers and 
stakeholders, and representatives from government and parliamentary bodies, industry and 
non-governmental organisations. They were recruited using a UK Research Council database 
of energy researchers, stakeholder lists developed by UKERC, and through a snowballing 
technique (Bryman, 2016) with assistance from across the UKERC membership, in order to 
ensure we reached a wide and varied energy stakeholder community. This involved an active 
effort to strike a balance between niche actors and organisations, alongside more established 
ones.  
 
The survey topic statements were developed through several months of desk-based research 
and collaboration between the authors, through advice and feedback at a project steering 
group, as well as a pilot phase with the UKERC research community in summer 2017. 
Following Miles et al. (2016, p. 102) and with a keen awareness of the diversity of our intended 
sample across different disciplines and professions, we developed topic statements that were 
as far as possible succinct, precise, unambiguous, devoid of confusing jargon or loaded terms, 
while at the same time being credible, inclusive and amenable to diverse responses. The 
surveys were administered online using Qualtrics software. 
 
Under each survey topic, participants were asked to assess the likelihood of different 
propositions about the UK’s energy system in 2040. Inspired by de Loë’s model for Policy 
Delphi studies (de Loë, 1995), participants were asked to assess the propositions on a 4-point 
Likert scale with an additional option of ‘undecided/cannot say’. They were then asked to 
explain the reasoning behind their answer, with reference to relevant supporting evidence. In 
this way, the survey went beyond merely capturing the diversity of expectations amongst 
experts, but also enabled us to understand the reasoning and contingencies underlying these 
differences.  
 
In line with other Policy Delphi studies, there was a decline in participants between the first 
and second round (Gordon, 1994; van de Linde and van der Duin, 2011): 127 participants 
completed the first round survey – although participants sometimes skipped questions, 
possibly due to a lack of relevant expertise, time limitations and/or felt fatigue (Dayé, 2018). 
Over half (54%) of Round 1 participants (n=69) also took part in Round 2. To minimise 
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participant fatigue, some questions on topics where consensus was high in Round 1 were 
omitted in Round 2. In addition, rather than presenting all Round 1 participant comments to all 
respondents for each question in Round 2, each participant was instead presented with a 
frequency table of the Round 1 participants’ assessments, a concise summary of the range of 
arguments deployed, and her/his own previous quantitative and qualitative answers. They 
were then given the opportunity to change their Round 1 response, and offer any additional 
comments. Since a Policy Delphi does not seek to establish consensus, the process ends 
once views have been judged to have stabilised, which in this case – given the limited 
instances of changed views between Rounds 1 and 2 (see Section 4) – occurred at the second 
round. 
 
The data was analysed in SPSS and NVivo 11 software packages. For the quantitative Likert 
scale data, we applied de Loë’s (1995, p.62) consensus measure to calculate the extent of 
consensus reached for each statement. As shown in Table 1, this measures consensus on a 
scale between ‘none’ and ‘high’, depending on how the responses are spread across the 
categories (highly unlikely, unlikely, likely or highly likely), taking into account that there are 
contiguous categories (i.e. likely and highly likely; or unlikely and highly unlikely). For example, 
a statement would have a ‘high’ consensus score if either 70% of the valid answers are in a 
single category, or if 80% of the valid answers are in two contiguous categories. Where the 
scores for one single category and across two contiguous categories differ, the statement is 
given the highest of the two scores.  
 
Table 1: De Loë’s method for measuring Delphi Survey consensus (de Loë, 1995) 
 
Extent of consensus 
Minimum proportion of valid 
answers within one category 
Minimum proportion of valid answers 
across two contiguous categories 
High 70% 80% 
Medium 60% 70% 
Low 50% 60% 
  
 
The qualitative comments were systematically coded in terms of whether they supported the 





In this section, we present a selection of the survey results relating to two particularly 
challenging and contested parts of the UK energy system transition: heating in buildings and 
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personal transport. In discussing the results, we treat the quantitative and qualitative data 
differently: while we present the quantitative results in full (in Tables 2 and 3 below), we 
discuss the qualitative data thematically so as to represent the diversity of perspectives offered 
in open text responses (Small, 2011). 
 




At present, approximately 80% of all commercial and domestic buildings in the UK are 
connected to a national natural gas network for the supply of heat (Chaudry et al, 2015). In 
addition, energy use in buildings (including space heating, water heating and cooking) 
accounts for nearly 20% of the UK’s carbon emissions (BEIS, 2018) and less than 5% of the 
energy used for heating buildings is produced from low carbon sources (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2019). The established way of providing heating for buildings in the UK cannot 
continue for much longer if climate policy targets are to be met (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2016). By 2050, the Committee on Climate Change has estimated that 90% of UK 
homes will need to be supplied by low carbon sources – i.e. excluding natural gas (Committee 
on Climate Change, 2019). 
 
In this context, a variety of low carbon heat supply solutions are being considered, across 
different scales of infrastructure and governance. They include, for example, local / community 
-scale district heating networks (a potentially highly disruptive supply infrastructure for the UK, 
both technically and socially), a switch from domestic gas boilers to domestic electric heat 
pumps (which is disruptive at the level of individual buildings and also the electricity grid), or 
the repurposing of the UK gas distribution infrastructure, so that it can distribute low carbon 
gas for heating, such as hydrogen (a relatively continuity-based solution, at least for local 
infrastructure and domestic end-users). To address the disruptive or continuity-based 
possibilities for UK heating futures by 2040, participants were asked to assess the likelihood 
of three distinct propositions: 
 
1. Local, municipal and community-based provision will dominate UK buildings’ heating 
2. National infrastructure will continue to dominate UK buildings’ heating, with some 
repurposing 
3. A patchwork mix of technologies at different scales will have emerged, but no single 




The participants were asked to explain their answers with reference to sources of evidence 
where possible. The Round 1 results are displayed below. 
 
Table 2: The likely pattern of buildings’ heating in the UK in 2040 
 
* i.e. excluding ‘undecided’ / ‘cannot say’ responses. 
 
As  
Table 2 shows, 70% of all respondents considered that local, municipal and community-based 
provision is unlikely or highly unlikely to become dominant by 2040; 62% thought it likely or 
highly likely that national infrastructure would continue to dominate, while more than three 
quarters of all participants (76%) considered a ‘patchwork mix’ to be likely or highly likely. In 
terms of overall transition logics, this suggests that most participants anticipate a relatively 
continuity-based transition for buildings’ heating in the UK up to 2040, with some emerging 
disruption.  
 
Parametric uncertainties  
 
One reason why participants disagree about heating futures is that their arguments rely on 
estimates of specific parameters which are uncertain and disputed. The two most frequently 
discussed (and contested) parameters in respondents’ comments are the technical 
performance of the different types of heating provision, and the feasible pace of change in 
terms of the diffusion of low carbon solutions across the UK building stock. While a small 
number of participants reasoned that these parameters mean that it is too soon to decide 
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dominate 
9    
(9%) 
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technologies at 








1      
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However, parametric uncertainty for buildings’ heating was not narrowly restricted to 
assessing the cost, performance and diffusion rate for specific heating technologies. 
Participants also applied a range of technical and social performance criteria across 
sociotechnical infrastructures. For example, those who consider it likely that incumbent 
infrastructure will remain dominant tended to highlight the economies of scale and 
standardisation benefits associated with a single national infrastructure, the high costs of 
emerging alternatives, and the popularity of established technology amongst consumers: 
“Making the best use of existing national infrastructure and assets (rather 
than building new ones at a local level) will minimise the disruption caused 
and additional costs incurred.” 
Senior manager at an energy networks company 
 
“The current vogue is to say that we need an array of solutions for heating.  
I don't buy that at all.  All industries that deliver at low cost have high degrees 
of standardisation and economies of scale… I do not believe in a mix and I 
think the idea of a mix is muddying the debate a lot.” 
Senior industry consultant 
  
By contrast, those participants who anticipate a more disruptive transition (in terms of either a 
patchwork mix of solutions, or a more decisive transition to local and community based 
provision) not only questioned the technical and economic feasibility of repurposing existing 
infrastructure, but also highlighted the importance of local context in assessing the likeliest 
pathway (in that different technologies are better suited to different types of housing stock, 
local geography and communities):   
“Different technologies make best sense in different settings… multiple 
solutions will co-exist.” 
Professor of social science 
“Due to geographic [and] demographic constraints (income levels, policy 
views) and the state of building stock, it is unlikely that one technology will 
dominate.”  
Senior academic energy modelling researcher 
 
As participants holding different views referenced different assessment criteria – scale 
economies and standardisation versus diversity and local ‘fit’ – they are unlikely to agree on a 






Structural uncertainties for heating futures arise in a number of ways, in terms of interactions 
across different parts of the energy system and system boundaries. For example, in assessing 
the feasible pace of change by 2040, respondents’ comments included judgements about 
structural stability or instability – i.e. whether sociotechnical arrangements for buildings’ 
heating are likely to be ‘locked-in’ around existing (albeit repurposed) infrastructure (Unruh, 
2002), or may reach a tipping-point which would allow for more radical change. For many, 
incumbent infrastructure was unlikely to lose its dominant status: 
 
“[An] incremental approach based on existing networks is the most likely 
outcome in most places.” 
Senior official in a public body 
 
“The outcome I consider most likely (though not desirable) is that …  change 
will be slow and uncertain.” 
Senior academic physical scientist 
 
Others argued the dominance of national infrastructure could be eroded by 2040 (allowing 
more radical change thereafter): 
 
“Technologies will emerge (and are emerging) that allow for more local 
initiatives.”  
Senior scientist in a NGO 
 
“The patchwork of approaches that we are likely to see … mean that radical 
change by 2060 could be … enabled.” 
Senior official in a public body 
 
Another aspect of structural uncertainty is the uncertain role of policy as a driver of change. 
Some respondents suggest that disruptive change in buildings’ heating is predicated on 
decisive national government action – without this, national infrastructure is likely to prevail:  
 
“Unless there are strong and directive signals from government, I don't see… 
big shifts in heating technologies by then.” 
 




For those anticipating a less decisive role for government, a patchwork mix of solutions is a 
more likely outcome: 
 
“I don't see this as an issue when central gov't direction is likely to be very 
specific. [A] mix of technologies [is] likely to follow from small-scale 
experimentation.” 
 
Senior academic social scientist 
 
 
Other participants emphasised the role of local community agency rather than national 
government, arguing that where local citizens are motivated and adequately resourced, then 




Our analysis revealed that views on the likely role of policy as a driver of change were 
themselves influenced in part by participants' values, in terms of political questions such as 
who should drive changes in the energy system. A small number of participants perceive a 
local governance approach as inherently preferable, as national government inhibits a 
desirable transition away from national infrastructure: 
 
“Whether the governance emerges that allows [local initiatives] to flourish to their full 
potential given the centralising tendency of UK policy remains to be seen.” 
Senior scientist in a NGO 
 
All participants who expressed a normative preference for local governance see a patchwork 
mix as likely or highly likely, and while some doubt that local, community or municipal provision 
will dominate by 2040, they consider it possible and desirable in the longer term. By contrast, 
participants who assume that central government should drive change typically thought the 
continued dominance of national infrastructure is the most likely outcome in 2040:  
 
“In the absence of national policy drivers, it is likely that significant change on heat will 
not happen until later.”  
Senior manager in an industry body 
 
The varied styles of reasoning seen among Round 1 participants help to explain why the 
majority of participants did not change their views in the second round, and why they also 
tended not to engage with the arguments of those they disagreed with. For each of the three 
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propositions on heating, less than 20% of the participants changed their answers between 
rounds. Most of those who did change shifted to the most popular proposition in Round 1 
(‘patchwork mix’) without explaining why they did so. Two participants moved away from this 
proposition, either because they were persuaded that it would be too expensive, or because 
they now felt that more evidence is required. Reflecting the difference in values in Round 1 
results (in terms of the desirable governance scale), one participant challenged others’ 
assumptions that decisive action by national government was needed to solve the heat 
challenge, arguing instead that there needs to be a gradual process of demonstration and 
learning at different levels to steer the heat transition over the next 10-20 years.  
 




In the UK, as in most developed countries, personal transport is dominated by user-owned 
conventional (internal combustion engine) vehicles, with nearly 80% of UK households owning 
a vehicle and approximately 60% of all trips in England taken by car (Department for 
Transport, 2019). Moreover, the transport sector accounted for 28% of all UK emissions in 
2017 (BEIS, 2018). While there are estimated to be over 150,000 ultra-low emission vehicles 
(i.e. electric, hybrid and hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles) in the UK at present (Department for 
Transport, 2018), the Committee on Climate Change has argued that adoption rates are too 
slow to achieve the UK’s target of reducing direct emissions from vehicles by 80% by 2050 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2019). Alongside a range of options for increasing adoption 
rates, it has been suggested that changing consumer behaviours and practices may also need 
to play a role if that target is to be achieved (Brand et al., 2019). 
 
From a consumer perspective, a transition which mainly involves the technological substitution 
of conventional vehicles with low emission vehicles represents a continuity-based transition 
logic, whereas a transition in which changes in consumer behaviours and practices play a 
significant role represents a disruptive transition logic. Survey participants were therefore 
asked to assess the likelihood of the following distinct propositions: 
 
1. Changes in consumer behaviours / practices, such as reductions in travel, shared 
ownership, and modal shift (including more use of walking, cycling, and public transport) 
will play a critical role in the UK's transport transition between now and 2040 
2. The UK's transport transition over the 2020s and 2030s will be dominated by 




Again, the participants were asked to explain their answers with reference to sources where 




Table 3: The UK transport sector transition to 2040 
* i.e. excluding ‘undecided’ / ‘cannot say’ responses. 
 
As Table 3 shows, the sample was approximately evenly divided on the likelihood of whether 
changes in consumer behaviours / practices will play a critical role in the UK’s personal 
transport transition. In stark contrast, there was very strong consensus that the transition will 
be dominated by technological substitution, with 97% deeming this likely or highly likely. As 
with buildings’ heating, this suggests that most respondents anticipate that a continuity-based 




Respondents’ comments reveal that the key sources of parametric uncertainty on transport 
futures relate to differences over the perceived performance and convenience of alternatives 
to user-owned motor vehicles and the envisaged feasible pace of change. For those who do 
not consider modal shift (i.e. greater use of walking, cycling, and public transport) likely to play 
a significant role, key factors include the lack of convenient alternatives, the current cost of 
public transport, and the challenges associated with changing the regular habits and practices 

















Changes in consumer 
behaviours / practices, such as 
reductions in travel, shared 
ownership, and modal shift 
(including more use of walking, 
cycling, and public transport) will 
play a critical role in the UK's 








4       
(4%) 
1          
(1%) 
98 None N/A 
The UK's transport transition 
over the 2020s and 2030s will 
be dominated by technological 






1     
(1%) 
1       
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ownership is not rising as fast as previously, but maintained that this is not a widespread 
change, and looking ahead, it is likely to be limited to particular groups (particularly younger 
people in urban areas): 
 
“Behaviour change is happening at the ‘margins’ which gets lots of 
publicity. However, the vast majority of the public are not changing their 
behaviour and are not showing any desire to change their behaviour” 
Senior transport planning specialist in a government body 
 
By contrast, those who believe that behavioural changes could be significant by 2040 tended 
to focus on other consumer considerations, such as the health benefits associated with 
cycling, and increasing demand for service-based business models. These participants 
typically extrapolated from marginal changes in transport behaviours (particularly in urban 
areas and among younger people) to argue that a decisive turn away from the dominance of 
user-owned motor vehicles could become mainstream by 2040. As for buildings’ heating, 
experts holding different views selected different key parameters – or made different 
assessments about the likely rate of change of key parameters – to form judgements about 




In terms of structural uncertainties, those who judged it unlikely that consumer practices and 
behaviours will have a significant impact on the UK’s personal transport transition tended to 
focus on a relatively narrow problem boundary (including the cost and convenience to 
consumers), whereas participants holding different views referenced a wider problem framing, 
including health and local air quality, and also, the potential for sociotechnical interactions to 
couple together to disruptive effect:  
 
“Air pollution concern and regulation will continue to drive [the] move away 
from internal combustion engines” 
Senior academic social scientist 
“Congestion in urban areas and other concerns such as health should 
mean that modal shifts etc. do play a significant role” 
CEO of a NGO 
 “The transition from internal combustion engines … will change the 
paradigm of ownership.” 
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As with heating, participants’ values on transport futures are revealed in terms of preferences 
towards who should be responsible for driving change (in terms of individual, community or 
national decision-makers), and also, a preference for either more social and behavioural 
solutions, or ‘technical fixes’: 
 
“The onus is on policy to create the context for a low-carbon transport transition. And 
yes, that means aggressive steps to exclude or marginalise cars and planes.” 
Senior academic interdisciplinary researcher 
 
“What is needed is fundamental shifts in values” 
Senior manager in an environmental NGO 
 
“Of course there will also be a welcome drive to make towns and cities more liveable 
by slowing traffic down but a hair shirt approach won't wash” 
Director of a government body 
 
However, unlike heating, there is no clear association between respondents’ values related to 
governance and agency, and expected outcomes for transport. For example, those who 
consider that policy-makers should drive a shift in consumer habits and preferences are 
approximately evenly split between those who believe that such a shift is likely to occur, and 
those who think it will remain marginal. Similar divisions are found among those who view 
consumption practices and behaviours as a matter of personal choice or community-scale 
decision-making, rather than government intervention. While values informed problem 
framings for transport – behaviour change as either an individualist or collectivist issue – they 
did not determine expectations i.e. whether behaviour change would actually play a significant 
role. 
 
In Round 2 the vast majority of respondents did not change their answers. Only six changes 
to Likert scale choices were made for each of the transport propositions, and only one of these 
was a substantial change (from unlikely to likely, for the significance of consumer change, 
without an explanation). While values do not correspond straightforwardly with expectations, 
the variation in values observed above may nonetheless help to explain respondents’ limited 
engagement with other views in Round 2, as some simply reiterated their view on the need for 
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consumer choices to reflect community values, or alternatively the need for policy action to 
promote changes in consumer behaviours and patterns. Round 2 comments also featured 
further discussion of the significance of niche changes in consumer behaviour and potential 
interactions between technologies and new societal trends. The speculative and indeterminate 
nature of these issues, and the way they allow for different problem framings, is potentially 





The survey findings offer new understandings of why experts disagree about the future of 
complex and dynamic sociotechnical systems, and how the Policy Delphi method can be used 
to map and understand such disagreements. In particular, they reveal that expert expectations 
about the future of the UK’s energy system reflect not only varied interpretations of the 
evidence base, current trends and policy actions – in terms of parametric and structural 
uncertainties – but also divergent assumptions and values. Assessments of uncertainty and 
underlying values are intertwined, in that values shape experts’ ordering of the key parameters 
and the structural relations or problem framings involved. Even so, it is important to consider 
the different reasons underlying expert disagreements, as they hold different implications for 
decision-makers and analysts. 
 
The survey was designed to elicit these differences in terms of different expectations about 
the role of alternative (continuity-based and disruptive) transition logics in UK energy system 
change. The focus was on two particularly challenging and contested parts of the energy 
system: buildings’ heating and personal transport. For both cases, a majority of respondents 
considered that, at least from a consumers’ perspective, a broadly continuity-based transition 
was more likely than a disruptive one, but with some emerging disruptive features. Survey 
participants’ more detailed responses reflected the many uncertainties and complex 
interdependencies involved in assessing likely futures.  
 
In assessing these uncertainties and complexities, experts’ disagreements are not restricted 
to judgements over parametric value. Rather, different ways of assessing issues such as the 
rate of technological change are evident, so that differences over apparently commensurable 
parameters cannot be reconciled by more and better evidence alone. Similarly, expert views 
reflect a range of structural uncertainties, including complex sociotechnical interactions within 
the system, varied system boundaries, and the endogenous role of policy and other human 
agency in shaping outcomes. Across both cases, those who believe that more disruption-
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based outcomes are likely tended to consider a wider problem framing than others, and 
Trutnevyte et al. (2016) argued that including a broad range of structural uncertainties in 
energy futures analysis was useful to reflect the wide span of possible outcomes. Our results 
suggest that alternative scenario logics based on continuity-led and disruptive narratives offer 
useful proxies for capturing a wide range of expert views and reasoning. 
 
Differences in experts’ values also emerged in the survey data. While participants did not 
always explicitly reference their normative views, comments on issues such as problem 
uncertainty, urgency, agency and societal response revealed underlying value differences. For 
instance, in personal transport, comments arguing for government leadership reflect a 
hierarchist worldview, while those calling for a change in consumer values reflect egalitarian 
or individualist perspectives (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982).  
 
Values were manifested, for example, in terms of experts’ normative associations with local or 
national governance of change, or preferences for mainly social or technical solutions. As 
anticipated in the expertise literature, experts’ judgements about the future are informed by the 
values they hold – such that those who hold positive normative associations with local and 
distributed governance of buildings’ heating expect a patchwork mix of solutions across 
different scales to emerge (Nelkin, 1975; Thompson, 1984; Jasanoff, 1990; Sarewitz, 2004; 
Hulme, 2009; Pye et al., 2018). However, there was no clear association between values and 
expected outcomes for the transport case. Overall, the evidence here suggests that although 
values inform and shape experts’ views, they don’t fully account for expert disagreement.  
 
For both topics, only a minority of the participants changed their views between rounds. While 
this may in part be due to participant groups lacking trust in the context of anonymised surveys 
(Wright and Rowe, 2011), the comments reveal a range of explanations, including diverging 
parametric uncertainty prioritisation, and diverging responses to structural features such as 
the appropriate level of agency – differences which are underpinned by value differences.  
 
Finally, while there were some instances of ‘epistemic challenge’ between participants which 
could provoke debate and encourage learning (Rip, 2003; Kattirtzi, 2016), these were rare, 
and overall the findings suggest limits to the potential for expert elicitation methods such as 
Policy Delphi to resolve policy disputes on contested topics. As Miles et al. (2016) noted, 
Policy Delphi is most appropriate as a decision support tool within a wider forecasting process, 







For challenging and contested areas of sociotechnical change, expert disagreements are 
unlikely to be resolved through the generation and synthesis of more and better evidence 
alone. As Pielke Jr and Stirling (Pielke, Jr, 2007; Stirling, 2010) both noted, this implies a need 
to make value differences more explicit in public policy processes, and to transparently 
articulate and compare alternative solutions reflecting different values.  
 
For scenario developers, our results suggest a need to go beyond parametric and structural 
uncertainties and reflect value and framing differences, using both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis. It is important that decision-makers and analysts, in their shared concern for 
evidence based decision-making, develop methods which acknowledge the diversity of expert 
perspectives and reasoning on the key uncertainties and choices involved. By setting out the 
diversity of expert reasoning on contested policy issues, Policy Delphi can help decision-
makers more fully appreciate the uncertainties, problem framings and evidence bases 
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